This paper revisits manipulation via capacities in centralized two-sided matching markets. Sönmez (1997) showed that no stable mechanism is nonmanipulable via capacities. We show that non-manipulability via capacities can be equivalently described by two types of non-manipulation via capacities: non-Type-I-manipulability meaning that no college with vacant positions can manipulate by dropping some of its empty positions; and non-Type-IImanipulability meaning that no college with no vacant positions can manipulate by dropping some of its filled positions. Our main result shows that the student-optimal stable mechanism is the unique stable mechanism which is non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities and independent of truncations. Our characterization supports the use of the student-optimal stable mechanism in these matching markets because of its limited manipulability via capacities by colleges.
via capacities and independent of truncations. Hence, the student-optimal stable mechanism is characterized in terms of non-manipulation properties of colleges and these properties imply that the mechanism is non-manipulable via preferences for students.
Our main result further supports the use of the student-optimal stable mechanism in applications. The NRMP changed the mechanism from the college-optimal stable mechanism to the student-optimal stable mechanism because of its non-manipulability via preferences for students. This change did not have only a positive effect on the students' side, but also on the colleges' side because a limited form of non-manipulability via capacities is guaranteed. Note that this is not guaranteed by the college-optimal stable mechanism because it is both Type-I-and Type-II-manipulable via capacities.
Our main result also points out positive effects of the use of the student-optimal stable mechanism in school choice (like in Boston): here priorities of schools are fixed or known and a school may only manipulate via capacities. Again under the studentoptimal stable mechanism schools with vacant seats cannot manipulate by dropping some of their empty seats.
A consequence of our main result is that any stable mechanism is Type-II-manipulable via capacities. Indeed avoiding manipulability via capacities by colleges with no vacant positions is difficult. Of course, any such solution will be unstable. For problems where each college has exactly one position no college can gain by underreporting its capacity. We show that one may use an iterative stable mechanism in order to avoid manipulations via capacities.
2 In determining which "no blocking" conditions an iterative stable mechanism may possess, recall that in school choice stability (of a matching) is equivalent to non-wastefulness (no empty positions are wasted) and fairness (no student justifiably envies another student at a college). We adopt weaker notions of these two "no blocking" conditions and establish in school choice a variant of the impossibility result by Sönmez (1997) : (a) there exists no mechanism which is 2 We provide details later.
non-wasteful, weakly fair, and non-manipulable via capacities; and (b) there exists no mechanism which is weakly non-wasteful, fair, and non-manipulable via capacities.
If both "no blocking" conditions are weakened, then a possibility emerges. Namely, any iterative stable mechanism satisfies weak non-wastefulness, weak fairness and non-manipulability via capacities. In applications, if non-manipulation via capacities is more important than stability, then an iterative stable mechanism may provide a practical solution since it satisfies the weaker versions of the "no blocking" conditions non-wastefulness and fairness.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the two-sided matching market, stability and manipulation via capacities. Section 3 provides the direct link for stable mechanisms between manipulation via capacities and manipulation via preferences. Section 4 introduces two types of non-manipulation via capacities and gives our main result: the characterization of the student-optimal mechanism. Section 5 introduces iterative (stable) mechanisms and establishes the variant of Sönmez (1997) for school choice.
The Model
A college admissions problem is a quadruple (S, C, q, R) where (i) S denotes the finite set of students, (ii) C denotes the finite set of colleges, (iii) q = (q c ) c∈C is list of natural numbers where q c is the capacity (or the number of available slots at college c), and (iv) R = (R v ) v∈S∪C is a list of preference relations. Since we consider the case where S and C remain fixed, we write (q, R) instead of (S, C, q, R). Furthermore, for any T ⊆ C, let q T = (q c ) c∈T and q −T = (q c ) c∈C\T , and for any c ∈ C, let
For any v ∈ S ∪ C, R v is a complete and transitive preference relation. Let P v denote the strict preference relation associated with R v . For any s ∈ S, R s is a strict preference relation on C ∪ {∅} where ∅ stands for being unmatched. For any c ∈ C, R c is a preference relation on 2 S such that R c is strict on S ∪ {∅} and R c is responsive over 2 S (to R c | S∪∅ 3 ): for all S ⊆ S and all s, s ∈ S\S , (i) S ∪ {s}P c S ∪ {s } ⇔ sP c s and (ii) S ∪ {s}P c S ⇔ sP c ∅.
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Let R c denote the set of all responsive preferences over 2 S .
Given R s , college c is acceptable under R s if cP s ∅. Similarly, for any R c , student s is acceptable under R c if sP c ∅. Let A(R c ) = {s ∈ S : sP c ∅} denote the set of students who are acceptable under R c .
A matching for a given capacity vector q is a function µ : S ∪ C → 2 S∪C such that (i) for all s ∈ S, |µ(s)| ≤ 1 and µ(s) ⊆ C;
(ii) for all c ∈ C, |µ(c)| ≤ q c and µ(c) ⊆ S; and (iii) for all s ∈ S and all c ∈ C, µ(s) = c if and only if s ∈ µ(c).
The main concept is stability of a matching: no student should be matched to an unacceptable college, no college should be matched to any unacceptable student, and no student-college pair blocks the matching because they mutually prefer each other.
Given a problem (q, R), a matching µ for q is stable if (a) (individual rationality for students) for all s ∈ S, µ(s)R s ∅;
(b) (individual rationality for colleges) for all c ∈ C, µ(c) ⊆ A(R c );
(c) (no blocking pair) there exists no s ∈ S and c ∈ C such that cP s µ(s) and either [|µ(c)| < q c and sP c ∅] or [sP c s for some s ∈ µ(c)]. Gale and Shapley (1962) show that the set of stable matchings is non-empty for any problem (q, R). Furthermore, the set of stable matchings has a lattice structure and there exists a stable matching, called the student-optimal stable matching which is weakly preferred to any other stable matching by the students and which is worst for the colleges among all stable matchings. Similarly, there exists a college-optimal stable matching which is weakly preferred to any other stable matching by the colleges.
The student-optimal stable matching can be calculated via the deferred-algorithm (DA) with students proposing and the college-optimal stable matching via the DAalgorithm with colleges proposing. Furthermore, at any two stable matchings, any college fills the same number of positions; and if a college does not fill all its positions at a stable matching, then this college is matched to the same set of students under all stable matchings.
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A mechanism (or mechanism) ϕ associates with any problem (q, R) a matching ϕ(q, R) for the capacity vector q. A mechanism ϕ is stable if for any problem (q, R), ϕ(q, R) is stable. Let DA S denote student-optimal stable mechanism choosing for each problem (q, R) its student-optimal stable matching (determined for each problem via the DA-algorithm with students proposing). Let DA C denote the college-optimal stable mechanism.
In many situations capacities are private information and a college may attempt to manipulate a mechanism via underreporting its capacity.
Definition 1 Let R be a profile, q be a capacity vector, and ϕ be a mechanism. Then ϕ is manipulable via capacities at (q, R) if there exists c ∈ C and q c ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q c } such that
We say that ϕ is non-manipulable via capacities if for any problem (q, R), ϕ is not manipulable via capacities at (q, R).
The principal result of Sönmez (1997) is the following.
Theorem 1 (Sönmez, 1997 , Theorem 1) Suppose there are at least three students and two colleges. Then there exists no mechanism that is stable and nonmanipulable via capacities.
5 All these properties of stable matchings are stated in the illuminating introduction to two-sided matching by Roth and Sotomayor (1990) .
Manipulation via Preferences
An important concern of clearinghouses in centralized markets is whether a mechanism can be profitably manipulated via misreporting preferences. If this is the case, then the outcome of the mechanism may not be based on the true information of the participants.
Definition 2 Let R be a profile, q be a capacity vector, and ϕ be a mechanism. Then ϕ is manipulable via preferences at (q, R) if there exists c ∈ C and R c ∈ R c such that
We say that ϕ is non-manipulable via preferences if for any problem (q, R), ϕ is not manipulable via preferences at (q, R).
Note that the above definition focusses only on manipulation via preferences by colleges. The following establishes for stable mechanisms an important link between manipulation via capacities and manipulation via preferences.
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Theorem 2 Let ϕ be stable mechanism, q be a capacity vector, and R be a profile.
If ϕ is manipulable via capacities at (q, R), then ϕ is manipulable via preferences at
Proof. If ϕ is manipulable via capacities at (q, R), then there exists some c ∈ C and q c ∈ {1, . . . , q c } such that ϕ(q c , q −c , R)(c)P c ϕ(q, R)(c). Let R c ∈ R c be such
Since ϕ is stable, c fills the same number of positions under all stable matchings, and
and ϕ is manipulable via preferences at (q, R), the desired conclusion.
These two types of manipulation via capacities have the following interpretations.
Type-I-manipulability means that a college with vacant positions gains from giving up some of its unfilled positions. Type-II-manipulability means that a college with no vacant positions gains from giving up some of its filled positions. Then a college is ready to forego some of its students (leaving these positions empty) in order to exchange some of the other students for better students. Of course, a college could simultaneously give up some of its filled positions and forego some of its students, giving rise to a third type of manipulability via capacities. By the lemma below, such a third type of non-manipulability is unnecessary for determining the non-manipulability via capacities of a mechanism.
Lemma 1 Let ϕ be a mechanism. Then ϕ is non-manipulable via capacities if and only if ϕ is both non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities and non-Type-II-manipulable via capacities.
Proof. (Only if) It is straightforward that if ϕ is non-manipulable via capacities,
then ϕ is both non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities and non-Type-II-manipulable via capacities.
(If) Suppose that ϕ is both non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities and non-Type-II-manipulable via capacities. Let q be a capacity vector and R be a profile. Let q c ∈ {1, . . . , q c }. Now if |ϕ(q, R)(c)| = q c , then from non-Type-II-manipulability we obtain ϕ(q, R)(c)R c ϕ(q c , q −c , R)(c); and if |ϕ(q, R)(c)| < q c and |ϕ(q, R)(c)| ≤ q c , then from non-Type-I-manipulability we obtain ϕ(q, R)(c)R c ϕ(q c , q −c , R)(c). Otherwise, if both |ϕ(q, R)(c)| < q c and q c < |ϕ(q, R)(c)| = f c , then from non-Type-I-manipulability we
Now if |ϕ(f c , q −c , R)(c)| = f c , then from non-Type-II-manipulability we obtain that
By transitivity of R c and (1), ϕ(q, R)(c)R c ϕ(q c , q −c , R)(c), the desired conclusion. If both |ϕ(f c , q −c , R)(c)| < f c and |ϕ(f c , q −c , R)(c)| ≤ q c , then from non-Type-I-manipulability we obtain ϕ(f c , q −c , R)(c)R c ϕ(q c , q −c , R)(c). Thus, by transitivity of R c and (1), ϕ(q, R)(c)R c ϕ(q c , q −c , R)(c), the desired conclusion. If
By using similar arguments and the transitivity of R c , this and (1) yield in a finite number of steps (since q c is finite) ϕ(q, R)(c)R c ϕ(q c , q −c , R)(c), the desired conclusion.
Before stating the main result, we introduce an invariance property for a mechanism: it says that for any given problem, if a college truncates its preference by leaving unchanged its ranking over students and restricting its set of acceptable students without dropping any of the students it is matched to, then for the problem with the truncated preference the college should be matched to the same set of students.
We say that a mechanism ϕ is independent of truncations if for any problem (q, R),
for any c ∈ C, and for any truncation R c of R c such that ϕ(q, R)(c) ⊆ A(R c ), we have
Independence of truncations is a weak invariance property which is satisfied by many stable mechanisms: DA S and DA C , or strictly order all matchings according to > and choose for any problem (q, R) the >-greatest matching which is stable under (q, R). Furthermore, as Ehlers (2008) shows, all mechanisms which are used in British entry-level medical markets satisfy this property.
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The result below characterizes DA S in terms of stability and axioms of nonmanipulability for colleges. Furthermore, the properties of stability, independence of 7 According to the author's knowledge, any mechanism, which is used in a real life market, satisfies this property.
truncations and non-Type-I-manipulability via capacities imply that the mechanism is non-manipulable via preferences for students since the student-optimal mechanism DA S satisfies this property (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982) .
Theorem 3 The student-optimal stable mechanism DA S is the unique stable mechanism which is independent of truncations and non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities.
Proof. First, we show that DA S is a stable mechanism which is independent of truncations and non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities. By definition, DA S is stable and by Ehlers (2008) , independent of truncations. In order to show that DA S is non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities, let q be a capacity vector and R be a profile.
is the worst stable matching for the colleges, it follows DA S (q, R)(c)R c DA S (q c , q −c , R)(c), the desired conclusion.
Second, let ϕ be a stable mechanism which is independent of truncations and nonType-I-manipulable via capacities. Suppose that ϕ = DA S . Then for some problem (q, R) and some c ∈ C we have ϕ(q, R)(c) = DA S (q, R)(c). Since both ϕ(q, R)
and DA S (q, R) are stable and ϕ(q, R)(c) = DA S (q, R)(c), college c must fill all its positions at all stable matchings, i.e. |DA S (q, R)(c)| = q c . Since ϕ(q, R) is stable and DA S (q, R) is the stable matching which is worst for the colleges, we obtain
Let s be the R c -worst student in DA S (q, R)(c) and R c be a truncation of R c such that
Since both ϕ and DA S are independent of truncations, we obtain both ϕ(q, R ) = ϕ(q, R) and DA S (q, R ) = DA S (q, R). Thus, by (2),
Consider the problem (q c + 1, q −c , R ). We show that DA S (q, R ) is stable under (q c + 1, q −c , R ): if not, then some pair (ŝ,ĉ) blocks DA S (q, R ) under (q c + 1, q −c , R ); obviously then we must haveĉ = c andŝP c ∅. Since s is the R c -worst acceptable student, we must haveŝP c s , which means that DA S (q, R ) is not stable under (q, R ), a contradiction. Since DA S (q, R ) is stable under (q c + 1, q −c , R ) and and |DA S (q, R )(c)| = q c < q c + 1, c is matched to the same set of students at all matchings which are stable under (q c + 1, q −c , R ). Thus, by stability of ϕ, we have ϕ(q c + 1, q −c , R )(c) = DA S (q, R )(c). Now by (3), we obtain ϕ(q, R )(c)P c ϕ(q c +1, q −c , R )(c).
Since |ϕ(q c + 1, q −c , R )(c)| = q c , this means that ϕ is Type-I-manipulable via capacities, a contradiction.
Note that in Theorem 3 non-Type-I-manipulability via capacities is a weak condition because it requires only that colleges with vacant positions cannot profitably manipulate by dropping some of its empty positions.
The independence of the properties in Theorem 3 is easily established: (i) DA C is a stable mechanism which is independent of truncations (but DA C violates nonType-I-manipulability via capacities); (ii) the mechanism leaving for all problems all students unmatched and all colleges having all positions empty is independent of truncations and non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities (but violates stability); and (iii) the mechanism choosing for all problems the same matching as DA S except for the problems (q, R) where q c = 1 for all c ∈ C, all students are acceptable for all colleges (i.e. A(R c ) = S for all c ∈ C), all colleges are acceptable for all students (i.e. cP s ∅ for all s ∈ S and all c ∈ C), and there are more students than colleges (i.e. |S| > |C|)). For those problems the mechanism chooses the college-optimal stable matching. It is straightforward to verify that this mechanism is stable and non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities but violates independence of truncations.
Remark 2 The feature of the statement of Theorem 3 that optimal stable mechanism for the students, DA S , is characterized in terms of non-manipulation properties of the other side (by colleges) has appeared in iterative elimination of dominated strategies. More precisely, for one-to-one matching markets Alcalde (1996) showed that the student-optimal mechanism is dominance solvable and for any problem it uniquely implements (in terms of dominance solvability) the college-optimal stable matching.
By Theorem 3, DA S is non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities. Now from Theorem 1 by Sönmez (1997) we obtain the following result.
Theorem 4 Suppose there are at least three students and at least two colleges. Then there exists no mechanism that is stable and non-Type-II-manipulable via capacities.
Theorem 4 points out why manipulation via capacities is problematic: colleges with no vacant positions may gain from manipulation.
Iterative Mechanisms
We know that any stable mechanism is susceptible to (Type-II-)manipulations via capacities. Colleges may underreport their capacities and fewer positions (than the true numbers) may be revealed which may result in more unmatched students. In applications it may be important to deter such manipulations in order to avoid unemployment (in entry-level labor markets) or unassigned students not attending any college (in education).
We will propose an iterative procedure which will be non-manipulable via capacities. We call (q, R) a base problem if for all c ∈ C, q c ∈ {0, 1}. A base mechanism φ associates with any base problem a matching. Below we provide a heuristic way to extend any base mechanism from the set of base problems to the set of all problems such that non-manipulability via capacities is guaranteed.
For any set C ⊆ C, let 1 C denote the vector of capacities such that all colleges in C have capacity 1 and all other colleges have capacity 0. Let q max = max c∈C q c be the maximal capacity in q.
Iterative φ-Mechanism: Let (q, R) be a problem. For any natural number l, let C l = {c ∈ C : q c ≥ l} and S l = ∪ c∈C φ(1 C l , R −(S 1 ∪···∪S l−1 ) )(c) (with the convention S 0 = ∅). The iterative φ-mechanism, denoted by I(φ), is defined as follows. For all c ∈ C, let
In other words, I(φ) gives first each college capacity 1 and calculates φ(1 C 1 , R). Then all assigned students are removed and it determines the colleges which have at least capacity 2 and gives all those ones again capacity 1 and determines again φ for the reduced problem, and so on. Each college is assigned to the union of all the students it is matched to at all steps in the iterative φ-mechanism.
Examples of iterative mechanisms are I(DA S ) and I(DA C ), or iterative Boston mechanism, iterative priority mechanisms, iterative top-trading cycles algorithm, etc.. 8 An iterative stable mechanism is an iterative mechanism where the base mechanism chooses for any base problem a stable matching.
It turns out that any iterative mechanism is (coalitionally) non-manipulable via capacities.
Definition 4 Let R be a profile, q be a capacity vector, and ϕ be a mechanism.
We say that ϕ is coalitionally manipulable via capacities at (q, R) if there exists ∅ = T ⊆ C and q T = (q c ) c∈T with q c ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q c } for any c ∈ T , such that ϕ(q T , q −T , R)(c)P c ϕ(q, R)(c) for all c ∈ T . We say that ϕ is coalitionally nonmanipulable via capacities if for any problem (q, R), ϕ is not coalitionally non-manipulable via capacities at (q, R).
Proposition 1 Let φ be a base mechanism. The iterative φ-mechanism I(φ) is coalitionally non-manipulable via capacities.
Proof. Let (q, R) be a problem, ∅ = T ⊆ C and q T = (q c ) c∈T be a capacity vector such that q c ≤ q c for all c ∈ T . Suppose that for all c ∈ T we have I(φ)(q T , q −T , R)(c)P c I(φ)(q, R)(c). Let q = (q T , q −T ), C l = {c ∈ C : q c ≥ l}, and
First, suppose that for some c ∈ T , we have I(φ)(q, R)(c)\I(φ)(q T , q −T , R)(c) = ∅.
Choose the minimal index k ∈ {1, . . . , q max } such that for some c ∈ T we have
Then from the fact that N \T did not change their capacities, by our choice of k and T ⊆ C k , we have for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, 1
If T C k , then there exists c ∈ T such that q c < k. By our choice of k and
Then the argument below can be used to show that this case cannot occur.
For all c ∈ T , let I(φ)(q, R)(c) ⊆ I(φ)(q T , q −T , R)(c). If I(φ) were coalitionally manipulable at (q, R), then for all c ∈ T we have I(φ)(q T , q −T , R)(c)P c I(φ)(q, R)(c) and I(φ)(q, R)(c) I(φ)(q T , q −T , R)(c). Now for all c ∈ T we have
Choose c ∈ T such that q c = k ≤ q c for all c ∈ T . Then from the fact that N \T did not change their capacities and by our choice of c and q c = k, we have for
. By (4) and our choice of c and k, we obtain that for all
Hence, I(φ) is not coalitionally manipulable via capacities at (q, R), the desired conclusion.
Remark 3 A weaker form of coalitional manipulation via capacities is where in Definition 4 we have ϕ(q T , q −T , R)(c)R c ϕ(q, R)(c) for all c ∈ T with strict preference holding for at least one c ∈ T . We say that ϕ strongly coalitionally non-manipulable via capacities if for any problem, there is no weaker form of coalitional manipulation via capacities. It can be checked that the iterative DA S -mechanism I(DA S ) is strongly coalitionally non-manipulable via capacities 9 whereas the iterative DA Cmechanism I(DA C ) does not satisfy this property.
Now one may wonder which properties may be inherited by the iterative φ-mechanism from the base mechanism φ. Recall that in school choice stability is divided into two "no blocking" properties: non-wastefulness and fairness. We will be interested whether iterative mechanism can satisfy any kind of these two "no blocking" conditions.
Non-wastefulness means that there is no student-college pair (s, c) such that s prefers c to her current assignment and c has a vacant position which it prefers to fill with s instead of having the position empty.
Non-Wastefulness: For all problems (q, R), there exists no student-college pair (s, c) such that cP s ϕ(q, R)(s), |ϕ(q, R)(c)| < q c , and sP c ∅.
Fairness means that there is no student-college pair (s, c) such that s prefers c to her current assignment and c prefers s to one of its assigned students.
Fairness: For any problem (q, R), there exists no student-college pair (s, c) such that cP s ϕ(q, R)(s) and sP c s for some s ∈ ϕ(q, R)(c).
We also introduce weaker notions of these two "no blocking" conditions. Weak fairness requires that no student-college pair mutually prefers each other to the match-9 The proof follows closely the proof of Proposition 1 and uses in the second part the fact that for any C C ⊆ C and any profile R, if
ing such that the college strictly prefers the student to all its assigned students.
Weak Fairness: For all (q, R), there exists no student-college pair (s, c) such that cP s ϕ(q, R)(s) and sP c s for all s ∈ ϕ(q, R)(c).
A weaker notion of non-wastefulness is the following: there is no student-college pair (s, c) such that both s is unmatched and s prefers c to her current assignment and c has a vacant position which it prefers to fill with s instead of having the position empty.
Weak Non-Wastefulness: For all problems (q, R), there exists no student-college pair (s, c) such that ϕ(q, R)(s) = ∅, cP s ϕ(q, R)(c), |ϕ(q, R)(c)| < q c , and sP c ∅.
For school choice we establish the following variant of Sönmez's impossibility result for college admissions.
Theorem 5 Suppose there are at least four students and at least two colleges. Then (a) there exists no mechanism that is non-wasteful, weakly fair, and non-manipulable via capacities; and (b) there exists no mechanism that is weakly non-wasteful, fair and non-manipulable via capacities.
Proof. We prove both (a) and (b) via the same example. Consider the following problem: let S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 }, C = {c 1 , c 2 }, and R be a profile such that R s 1 : 10 This means c 1 P s1 c 2 P s1 ∅.
11 If a student is not indicated in the matching, then the student is unmatched under this matching.
First, we show (a). Suppose to the contrary that there exists a mechanism ϕ satisfying the properties of (a) in Theorem 5. By weak fairness of ϕ (which implies fairness for base problems) and non-wastefulness, we have ϕ(1, 1, R) = µ. By nonwastefulness, ϕ(4, 1, R) = µ . Now by s 2 P c 1 {s 1 , s 3 , s 4 }, ϕ(1, 1, R)(c 1 )P c 1 ϕ(4, 1, R)(c 1 ), which means that ϕ is manipulable via capacities at (4, 1, R), a contradiction.
Second, we show (b). Suppose to the contrary that there exists a mechanism ϕ satisfying the properties of (b) in Theorem 5. By fairness and weak non-wastefulness we have ϕ(1, 1, R) = µ. Consider the problem (3, 1, R). By weak non-wastefulness and our construction, for all s ∈ S, ϕ(3, 1, R)(s) = s. Now if ϕ(3, 1, R)(s 4 ) = c 2 , then c 2 P s 2 ϕ(3, 1, R)(s 2 ) and s 2 P c 2 s 4 , which means that ϕ violates fairness, a contradiction.
Thus, ϕ(3, 1, R)(s 4 ) = c 1 . Similarly, it follows that ϕ(3, 1, R)(s 3 ) = c 1 .
Now from s 4 ∈ ϕ(3, 1, R)(c 1 ), s 1 P c 1 s 4 , s 1 P c 1 s 4 and fairness we obtain ϕ(3, 1, R) = µ . By s 2 P c 1 {s 1 , s 3 , s 4 }, we have ϕ(1, 1, R)(c 1 )P c 1 ϕ(3, 1, R)(c 1 ), which means that ϕ is manipulable via capacities at (3, 1, R), a contradiction.
Since stability implies (weak) non-wastefulness and (weak) fairness, Theorem 1 follows from Theorem 5 (when there are more than four students). Reformulated for school choice, Sönmez (1997, Theorem 1) shows that there exists no mechanism which is non-wasteful, fair, and non-manipulable via capacities. Weakening either non-wastefulness or fairness as above still results in an impossibility regarding nonmanipulability via capacities.
When both "no blocking" properties are weakened, a possibility emerges.
Proposition 2 Let φ be a stable base mechanism. Then the iterative φ-mechanism I(φ) is weakly non-wasteful, weakly fair, and non-manipulable via capacities.
Proof. By Proposition 1, I(φ) is non-manipulable via capacities. Let (q, R) be a problem.
In showing weak non-wastefulness, suppose that there exists (s, c) such that I(φ)(q, R)(s) = ∅, cP s I(φ)(q, R)(s), |I(φ)(q, R)(c)| < q c , and sP c ∅. But then for all l ∈ {1, . . . , q max }, s / ∈ S l , and for some k ∈ {1, . . . , q c }, φ(1 C k , R −(S 1 ∪···∪S k−1 ) )(c) = ∅.
This means that φ(1 C k , R −(S 1 ∪···∪S k−1 ) ) is not stable because cP s ∅, sP c ∅, and s / ∈ S 1 ∪ · · · ∪ S k−1 . Thus, φ is not a stable base mechanism, a contradiction.
In showing weak fairness, suppose that there exists (s, c) such that cP s I(φ)(q, R)(s) and s P c s for all s ∈ I(φ)(q, R)(c). Since φ is stable for base problems, we have φ(1 C 1 , R)(c) = ∅. Let s = φ(1 C 1 , R)(c). But then by stability of φ(1 C 1 , R) and s = s, s P c s, a contradiction.
In applications, if non-manipulation via capacities is more important than stability, then an iterative stable mechanism may provide a practical solution since it satisfies the weaker versions of the two "no blocking" conditions non-wastefulness and fairness. If stability is more important than non-manipulation via capacities, then the student-optimal stable mechanism is a good solution because of its limited manipulability via capacities.
